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I.

Introduction
The state of the compliance function today is the culmination of a roughly twenty year

expansion fueled by new laws, regulations, and agency guidance.1 The provenance of these
programs and systems of control currently advocated by regulators are diverse. Fundamentally,
however, compliance programs are designed to monitor and deter wrongdoing within an
organization through the implementation of policies and procedures.2 Enforcement falls “within
the purview of numerous federal and state agencies,” and as result, compliance programs are an
amalgamation that reflect the prescriptions and preferences of multiple agencies with varying
degrees of civil and criminal oversight authority. 3
In response to the deluge of new compliance-related laws and guidance, companies must
grapple with defining the role of the compliance function and determining where within the
organization the department should be located. This debate extends beyond the common
concerns that accompany corporate resource allocation because of the effect that the compliance
department has on the legal position of an organization and because government has
demonstrated certain preferences. In large organizations, the compliance department either
reports to the general counsel (GC) in some subordinate position, or exists apart from the GC as
an equal, board-level reporting entity. The much more limited resources of smaller organizations
commonly necessitate that the duties of the GC and CCO to be located in a single office and/or
person. 4

1

Michele DeStefno, Creating a Culture of Compliance: Why Departmentalization May Not Be the Answer, 10
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 71, 87 (2014).
2
Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 960 (2009).
3
Id. at 958.
4
Michele DeStefno, supra note 1, at 72.
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This paper will begin with an explanation of the legal sources of corporate compliance
and why it has experienced such explosive growth over the last decade. This section will also
explain the basic divide between the government and industry over whether the corporate
compliance program should be compartmentalized. It will the examine the debate over whether
the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) should report to the General Counsel (GC), or whether the
CCO should be a standalone senior-level position reporting directly to the Board of Directors
(hereinafter, “the Board”). After discussing the respective compliance roles and reporting
obligations of the GC, the CCO, the Board and senior management, this paper will examine the
risks and benefits of both a consolidated and a bifurcated reporting structure. This paper
concludes that adopting an independent reporting structure, and empowering each with executive
authority, is the preferred structure for satisfying a company’s legal, ethical, and compliance
obligations.
II.

Legal Sources of Corporate Compliance
A corporation is a legal entity that has that authority to act as a single person.5 Since the

“corporate person” is a fictitious legal construct, under a respondeat superior standard of
corporate criminal and civil liability, the corporation assumes liability for the illegal and/or
negligent acts of its employees.6 To mitigate the effects of such liability, it is prudent for
management to develop and implement systems that are ordered first, to deterring misconduct;
and second, to identifying any residual malfeasance. Identifying misconduct, illustrates that an
organization is committed to cultivating ethical norms and allows a company to cooperate with
any government investigation.7

5

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
See John, Hasnas, Managing the Risks of Legal Compliance: Conflicting Demands of Law and Ethics, 39 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 507 (2008).
7
Id.
6
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The sources for corporate compliance are the common law, regulatory guidance, civil
settlement and deferred prosecution agreements between industry and enforcement agencies, ,
and the federal sentencing guidelines.
A. In re Caremark
In In re Caremark, a 1996 shareholder derivate suit, the Court of Chancery of Delaware
held that directors are obligated to ensure that their corporation maintains an effective
“information and reporting system . . . and that failure to do so under some circumstances may,
in theory, render a director liable for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal
standards.”8 Under this standard, directors possess a duty to ensure the implementation of an
effective compliance program, however, the composition of that program remains a question of
business judgment.9 In Caremark shareholders brought suit against the directors alleging that
their failure to monitor the business practices of the organization effectively allowed fraudulent
behavior that resulted in a criminal indictment and significant fines.10 The final settlement
against the organization was “huge” by standards of the time however, the court held that a
demonstration of a good faith effort to implement an effective compliance program insulated the
directors personal liability for breach of their fiduciary duty of care.11 In Stone v. Ritter, the
Delaware Supreme Court adopted the Caremark test as the standard under which directors can
satisfy their duty of care by establishing, in good faith, a system of reporting and monitoring.12
Importantly, corporate law does not impose liability where illegal behavior occurs despite best
efforts at effective compliance.

In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
Id.
10
Id. at 960.
11
Id. at 971.
12
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
8
9
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As a result, while Caremark is the seminal case of director liability to shareholders for
failure to monitor, a breadth of other civil and criminal laws punish wrongful corporate behavior
irrespective of the presence of corporate oversight, taking monitoring into account only at the
penalty stage.13 Professor Bullard notes that the liability directors and managers face as a result
of administrative penalties and criminal charges is greater “than by the prospect of private
Caremark liability under state corporate law.”14 Even while most cases involving corporate
misdeeds settle, it is the federal sentencing guidelines that apply to business organizations that
better inform directors performance of their oversight responsibilities.15
B. United States Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, DOJ Memorandum, and
US Attorney’s Manual
First promulgated in 1991, the United States Organizational Sentencing Guidelines seek
to encourage organizations and their agents to develop and implement “internal mechanism for
preventing, detecting, and reporting criminal conduct.”16 The Sentencing Guidelines reflect that
organizations act through their agents and thus are vicariously liable for the actions of those
agents.17 To encourage greater self-policing by organizations, the Sentencing Guidelines offer
incentives to organizations to adopt compliance programs to prevent, detect, and sanction
criminal misconduct.18 First, the Sentencing Guidelines enumerate components of an “effective
compliance program,”19 And direct that prosecutors and judges should employ an assessment of
the effectiveness of the compliance program in determining the organization’s fine20 .21 There

Mercer Bullard, Caremark’s Irrelevance, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 15, 25 (2013).
Id. at 27.
15
In re Caremark, supra note 8.
16
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Ch. 8, introductory cmt. (2015).
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. at §8B2.1.
20
Id. at §8C2.4.
21
Id. at §8C2.5.
13
14
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fine may be mitigated if the organization had an effective compliance program in place at the
time of the misconduct,22 and/or if the organization self-reported the offense to the appropriate
government authority.23
In September of 2015, Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates issued what is commonly
known as the “Yates Memo,”24 which represents the latest in a series of DOJ memorandum
regarding prosecution of corporations. This began in 1999 with the “Holder Memo,”25 providing
general guidance on bringing charges against corporations. This guidance was further developed
in the “Thompson Memo”26 (2003), the “McNulty Memo”27 (2006), and the “Filip Memo”28
(2008). The guidance contained in these memos sets forth principles for charging corporations29
that DOJ incorporated into the U.S. Attorney Memo’s Manual in the Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations, and are now binding on all federal prosecutors.30
The Yates Memo precludes corporate settlements that are not accompanied by holding
individual employees who engaged in the illegal behavior Because corporate crime cannot occur
absent the acts of its employees, individual accountability is the new and important lever through

22

Id. at §8C2.5(f)(1).
Id. at §8C2.5(g)(1).
24
Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t Justice, Individual Accountability for
Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download.
25
Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bringing Criminal Charges Against
Corporations (June 16, 1999), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/chargingcorps.PDF
26
Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan20_privwaiv_dojth
omp.authcheckdam.pdf.
27
Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006), available at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2007/07/05/mcnulty_memo.pdf.
28
Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, on Principles of Federal Prosecution
of Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/11/03/dagmemo-08282008.pdf.
29
Brandon L. Garrett, The Metamorphosis of Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 60, 101
(2016).
30
See U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorneys' Manual § 9-28.210 (2015), http://www.justice.gov/usam/united-statesattorneys-manual.
23
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which to the government seeks to obtain change in corporate behavior.31 The memo sets forth
guidance, in the form of six principles, on the means by which culpable individuals are to be held
accountable in corporate cases.32 Importantly, this guidance applies to criminal as well as civil
enforcement actions undertaken by DOJ.33 Consistent among the principles and the document as
a whole is the instruction that the DOJ considers sentence mitigation contingent on an
organization’s disclosure of misconduct and cooperation with any investigation.34
The US Attorney’s Manual gives prosecutors the discretion, in certain instances, to
choose whether or not to prosecute offenders for violations of federal criminal law.35
Prosecutors should consider, among other things, the deterrent effect of prosecution and its
impact of the public.36 Deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) “occupy an important middle
ground between declining prosecution and obtaining the conviction of a corporation.”37 When
DOJ enters into a DPA with an organization, a prosecutor typically brings but does not prosecute
charges against an organization. After the organization pays the agreed upon monetary
settlement and successfully completes the terms of the agreement, the prosecutor drops the
charges.38 DPAs are intended to “promote compliance with applicable law and to prevent
recidivism.” DPAs often require the rehabilitated company to adopt specific compliance
programs, which has the effect of making them more complaint. Compliance programs

31

See Yates Memo, supra note 24.
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
U.S. Attorneys' Manual , supra note 30, at § 9-28.200.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
U.S. Attorneys' Manual, supra note 30, at § 9-28.1100.
32
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frequently adopt as “best practice” elements of deferred prosecution agreements into their
compliance programs.39
C. HHS OIG Corporate Integrity Agreements and DOJ Deferred Prosecution
Agreements
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the administrative agency that
regulates organizations, providers, and individuals in the healthcare industry. HHS provides
instruction for crafting and implementing compliance programs through agency regulations and
guidance.40 In addition, the Medicare Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987
gave HHS the discretion to exclude any individual or entity that engages in fraud and other
misconduct.41 In the mid 1990’s HHS Officer of Inspector General (OIG), began entering into
Corporate Integrity Agreements (CIAs) with organizations under investigation for violations of
the False Claim Act.42 OIG now utilizes CIAs to resolve investigations arising under a variety of
civil false claim circumstances.43 In exchange for OIG’s agreement not to pursue exclusion from
Medicare, Medicaid, or other Federal Health Services, organizations agree to adopt the elements
set forth in the agreement.44 CIAs are tailored to the specific organization, however, they contain
many common features, for example the obligation to hire a compliance officer, retain an
independent review organization, and establish a confidential disclosure program.45

39

See Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The
Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1138 (2006).
40
See e.g. OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Mfrs., 68 FED. REG. 23731 (May 5, 2003), Office
of Inspector Gen. of the Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. & Am. Health Lawyers Ass’n., The Health Care
Director’s Compliance Duties: A Continued Focus of Attention and Enforcement (2011),
http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/compliance-guidance/docs/health_care_directors_compliance_duties.pdf.
41
42 U.S.C. §1320a-7(b), See Tracy D. Hubbell, Amy C. Mauro, & Dan Moar, Health Care Fraud, 43 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 603, 657 (2006).
42
Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitoriship Improve Corporate Compliance?, 34 IOWA J. CORP. L.
679, 686 (2009).
43
See Dept. of Health & Human Serv's, Office of Inspector Gen., Corporate Integrity Agreements,
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/compliance/corporate-integrity-agreements/index.asp (last visited April 12, 2016)
(describing history and features of CIAs).
44
Id.
45
Id.
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CIAs are not law, but rather are agreements entered into outside the judicial system for
the purpose of avoiding more serious punitive actions. However, “CIAs can impose more
rigorous compliance standards upon a corporation than the law itself doesIn effect, CIAs create
“private legislation” promulgated by an administrative agency over the assenting organization.46
While only binding on the organization that has entered into the agreement, CIAs communicate
what HHS deems to be best practices, which leads to the adoption of “industry-wide standards
that may never have been approved by the legislature.”47
DOJ uses deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs)48 to obtain corporate cooperation and
get offending organizations to change their behavior to help mitigate future misconduct.49 Use
of DPAs have increased over time for a variety of reasons, including concern about the collateral
effect that large judgment or criminal conviction will have an organization.50 However, the main
driver of DPAs is the desire to obtain an organization’s full cooperation. In 2015 this point was
reiterated in the Yates Memo that stated that organizations must provide DOJ with all of the
relevant facts and cooperate with a DOJ investigation in order to be eligible for cooperation
credit which is taken into consideration by U.S. attorneys’ when deciding whether or not to enter
into a DPA.51
D. Enron and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

46

Sharon Finnegan, supra note 46.
Id. at 661.
48
See e.g. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. HSBC Bank, 2013 WL 3306161 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11,
2102).
49
Symposium, Too Big to Jail: Overcoming the Roadblocks to Regulatory Enforcement: Deferred Prosecution and
Non-Prosecution Agreements and the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1303 (2013).
50
Id. at 1312 (pointing out that while concern about collateral effects was a concern for DOJ, the section of the
Thompson Memo, (supra, note 26) that dealt with deferred prosecution agreements was under VI dealing with
corporate compliance.)
51
See Yates Memo, supra, note 24.
47
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In the late 1990’s and early 200’s high profile accounting scandals brought down several
large organizations that roiled markets and led Congress to enact the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (“SOX”).52 SOX was designed to reform the way U.S. businesses operate and make it
harder for officers to perpetuate the type of accounting fraud that led to the collapse of Enron and
others.53 During Enron’s bankruptcy proceedings, it emerged that in-house and external counsel
had raised concerns about the legality of specific transactions, but that these concerns were either
dismissed by superiors or never made it up the reporting chain. For example, in one instance
several lawyers expressed concern to Ben Glisan, Enron’s financial officer, about an equity
position that appeared to be in violation of SEC regulations.54 Glisan, however, confirmed
“Enron’s confidence in Enron’s conclusions concerning the effect” of the position and
effectively suppressed the matter.55 The lawyers’ suspicions were later vindicated when Glisan
pled guilty to wire fraud and securities fraud in connection with that equity position.56
Section 307 of SOX sets forth general guidelines governing attorneys working for public
companies and instructs the SEC to implement rules mandating that attorneys report suspected
material violations of securities law.57 Additionally, section 307 imposes investigatory
obligations on the GC, or as the law identifies the position, the “Chief Legal Officer” (CLO).
SOX requires attorneys to report “evidence of a material violation of the securities laws or
breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or an agent thereof,” to either the

52

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28,
and 29 U.S.C.).
53
148 CONG. REC. S10563 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2002) (statement of Sen. Levin).
54
Final Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Exam’r, app. C, at 140-45, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 4, 2003).
55
Id.
56
Milton C. Regan, Jr., Ethics in Corporate Representation: Teaching Enron, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139, 1231
(Dec. 2005).
57
See 15 U.S.C. §7245.
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CEO, or the CLO.58 Upon receiving a report of malfeasance from whom the regulations denote
as the “reporting attorney,” the CLO must launch an inquiry into whether a violation has in fact
occurred, or is about to occur.59 The CLO is required to take all reasonable steps to respond
appropriately to the allegation and shall advise the reporting attorney of his or her actions and
findings.60
If after concluding the investigation, the CLO determines that no material violation has
occurred or will occur, he or she is required to apprise the reporting attorney as to the basis of his
or her conclusion.61 Importantly, the CLO may, in lieu of conducting an inquiry into the alleged
malfeasance, “refer a report of evidence of a material violation to a qualified legal compliance
committee,” so long as the committee had been constituted prior to the initial report.62 SEC
regulations define a qualified legal compliance committee as a committee formed by a public
company consisting of at least a member of the Board audit committee, or if none exists then a
member of an equivalent Board of independent directors, and two or more members of the Board
not employed by the company.63 The qualified legal compliance committee is tasked with,
among other things, investigating suspected material violations of law and reporting findings to
the CLO, CEO and the Board. This committee exists to advise company leadership and ensure
misconduct is adequately monitored
If the reporting attorney perceives that the CLO or CEO has failed to provide a sufficient
explanation as to why he or she concluded that no material violation has in fact occurred, that
attorney is required to elevate his or her concern further “up the ladder.”64 SEC regulations
58

Id.
17 C.F.R. §205.3(b)(2) (2003).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at §205.2(k).
64
1d. at §205.3(b)(3).
59
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provide that the reporting attorney shall report the evidence of the material violation to the
Board’s audit committee, or some other Board committee comprised solely of external directors,
or the Board itself, if no such committee of external directors exists.65 Additionally, the
regulations define the “trigger for an attorney’s obligation to report up-the-ladder” as an
objective, rather than subjective standard involving “credible evidence” that a material violation
has occurred.
These statutes, regulations, and guidance, along with additional instructions from
industry regulators form the basis of corporate compliance obligations and government
oversight.
III.

The Role of the General Counsel
The GC is the organization’s highest ranking legal counselor. The GC’s assists an

organization to become more efficient and compliant, however, such involvement must not
compromise the ability of the GC to “vigorously defend the organization after potential
violations of the law have been identified.”66
A. Dual Roles of Partner and Protector
Today’s GC, and other in-house lawyers, have responsibilities far beyond providing legal
advice to an organization. The GC is involved with all aspects of an organization and often
interacts directly with the Board and senior management as an advisor and a colleague.67 Former
General Electric GC Ben W. Heineman, Jr. has identified the often conflicting dual roles that the

65

Id.
J. Reginald Hill, Jenifer C. Peters, & Sheila W. Sawyer, The Relationship between Compliance Officer, In-House
Counsel, and Outside Counsel: An Essential Partnership for Managing and Mitigating Regulatory Risk, AM.
HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N. FRAUD AND COMPLIANCE FORUM 4 (Oct. 6-7 2014).
67
Id. at 3.
66
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GC plays as both a partner of business function leaders and guardian of the corporation’s
integrity.68
Senior managers often call upon the GC, who has the unique skill set acquired with a
legal education, to aid in navigating and evaluating business decisions. This can take the form of
performing “traditional” legal activities, such as helping to negotiate deals or draft contracts, or
can result in the GC acting in a business capacity, such as aiding leadership in making strategic
decisions.69 Notably, business units increasingly call upon the GC to act as a “transaction
facilitator.”70 The GC can help a Board structure business transactions, such as mergers or asset
divestures, and provide legal perspective on how the deal will affect other segments of the
organization.71 Given the complexity of modern business, it is typically advantageous and cost
effective to involve in-house lawyers in projects early on.72 The degree to which the business
side of an organization invites the GC to participate in strategic decision-making varies
depending on the company and upon the GC relationship with his or he business colleagues.
However, Heineman observes that business leaders embrace a GC who helps them to “get things
done.”73
The GC also acts as the guardian of a corporation’s reputation. It is valuable for an
organization to maintain a positive reputation in order to gain customers’ trust and, in theory at
least, create value for shareholders.74 Customers rely on the reputation of an organization to

68

Ben W. Heineman, Jr., In the Beginning, CORPORATE COUNSEL 1 (April 2006).
Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Caught in the Middle, CORPORATE COUNSEL 2 (April 2007).
70
Sarah Helene Duggin, The Pivotal Role of the General Counsel on Promoting Corporate Integrity and
Professional Responsibility, 51 ST. LOUIS L.J. 989, 1006 (2007)
71
Id.
72
Id. at 1007.
73
Ben W. Heineman, Jr., supra note 72.
74
R. William Ide III & Douglace H. Yarn, Public Independent Fact-Finding: A Trust-Generating Institution for an
Age of Corporate Illegitimacy and Public Mistrust, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1113, 1127 (2003).
69
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make judgments about the quality of an organization’s products and services.75 The Board
expects the GC to protect an organization’s reputation for trustworthiness by enacting controls to
ensure “strict adherence to financial, legal and ethical rules.”76 Shareholders delegate the
authority to monitor the operations and management of an organization to the Board.77
Misconduct tarnishes the reputation of the organization and can lead to shareholders losing
confidence in the Board.78
Every level of an organization plays a role in ensuring compliance with the law and
ethical norms. The Board and the CEO are expected to establish a “tone at the top” that reflects
a commitment to compliance.79 Despite its somewhat nebulous connotation, the government
takes this expectation seriously. Former SEC Commissioner Cynthia Glassman stated that
improving the “tone at the top” of organizations was one of the five main goals of SOX when it
was enacted in 2002.80 Because the GC has “comprehensive responsibility for the legal aspects
of an entity’s operation,” it falls to him or her, along with the CCO, to implement systems to
promote that tone at the top.81
B. Challenges Facing Today’s GC
In addition to the practical difficulties posed to a GC who subsists simultaneously in a
legal and business capacity, these lawyers face legal and ethical challenges related to the scope

75

Id.
Ben W. Heineman, Jr., supra note 71.
77
Gregory Todd Jones, Trust, Institutionalization, & Corporate Reputations: Public Independent Fact-Finding
From A Risk Management Perspective, 13 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 121, 128 (2006).
78
Id.
79
Cynthia A. Koller, Laura A. Paterson, Elizabeth A, Scalf, When Moral Reasoning and Ethics Training Fail:
Reducing White Collar Crime Through the Control of Opportunities for Deviance, 28 ND J. L. ETHICS & PUB POL'Y
549, 507 (2014).
80
Cynthia Glassman, SEC Comm’r, Remark’s Before the European Corporate Governance Summit: An SEC’s
Commissioner’s View: The Post-Sarbanes Oxley Environment for Foreign Issuers (March 2, 2005).
81
Sarah Helene Duggin, The Pivotal Role of the General Counsel in Promoting Corporate Integreity and
Professional Responsibility, 51 ST. LOUIS L.J. 989, 1033 (2007).
76
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of confidentiality and attorney-client privilege. The Rules of Professional Responsibility
maintain that it is incumbent upon the GC, and any other lawyer employed or retained by an
organization, to recognize the organization as the client.82 The GC does not represent the
constituents with whom he or she regularly communicates, including officers, directors, or the
board.83 While this distinction may be understood by the GC and the constituents intellectually,
in reality the demarcation can become obfuscated as personal relationships and loyalties among
the parties develop.84
One commentator notes that it may be “psychologic[aly] awkward” for the GC to owe
the organization professional allegiance, but have a duty to the individual manager with whom
he or she works on a daily basis.85 This can further complicate confusion about the GC’s role
with within an organization. For example, it is not unusual for a GC to be involved in strategic
planning or become a corporate director. There are many benefits to the GC acting in such a
dual capacity, however such a position can weaken the effectiveness of the GC as a manager and
a lawyer.86 For example, if the GC is also on the Board, the Board’s ability to monitor the legal
function becomes more difficult.87 At the same time, occupying this dual position increases the
risk that attorney-client privilege will not attach to communications. Privilege “covers only
those communications made between the corporate lawyer and the client intended to be
confidential and [that] are made for the primary purpose of obtaining legal advice or assurance,

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2003) (stating "a lawyer employed or retained by an organization
represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents”).
83
Michael W. Peregrine & Joshua T. Buchman, Managing the General Counsel/ Compliance Officer Relationship,
AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N CONNECTION, 34 (October 2011).
84
Deborah A. DeMott, Colloquium: Ethics in Corporate Representation: The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 956 (Dec. 2005).
85
Susanna M. Kim, Dual Identities and Dueling Obligations: Preserving Independence in Corporate
Representation, 68 TENN. L. REV. 179, 194 (2001).
86
Id. at 230.
87
Id.
82
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as opposed to business advice.”88 At a Board meeting, a GC/Board member can quickly slip into
a situation where he or she simultaneously offers a business decision and a legal opinion.89
Additionally, the Board can interpret a statement to be business advice, when it is in fact a legal
opinion.90 For this reason, as the GC assumes a greater managerial role, he or she must exercise
caution not to compromise privilege or give the false impression that privilege extends to
conversations that do not in fact qualify.
C. GC’s Reporting Requirements and Remembering that the Organization is the
Client
In 2003, the ABA House of Delegates updated the Model Rules to support greater
corporate governance practices.91 The ABA amended Rule 1.13 to require a lawyer to report to a
higher corporate authority malfeasance of which he or she becomes aware regardless of whether
it relates to his or her reputation.92 Prior to the 2003 Amendment, Rule 1.13 only required a
lawyer to report misconduct if the misconduct “was related to the [lawyer’s] representation.”93
Under the current rule, a lawyer has greater reporting obligations designed to encourage him or
her “to tack action to prevent or rectify corporate misconduct.”94
These updates coincide with the passage of SOX and the imposition of section 307
requirements mandating reporting suspect violations of law to the CLO, and Board.95 As
discussed above, SOX draws lawyers across an organization and “requires them to go through

88

Id. at 239.
Id. at 240.
90
Id. at 241.
91
See Report of the Am. Bar Ass’n Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, SK083 ALI-ABA 99 (March 31, 2003),
available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2003/journal/119c.pdf
92
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(f) (2003).
93
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (1993).
94
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Preliminary Report of the Am. Bar Ass’n Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, 58
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the general counsel—unless the attorney reasonably believes that a report to the chief legal
officer or to the chief legal officer and the CEO would be futile.”96
In order for a GC to remain effective and objective, he or she must have the “sufficient
status and independence” to recognize potential threats to the organization and take corrective
action that may be adverse to senior management and the Board.97 The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct provide that when dealing with a corporate constituent whose interest the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know is adverse to that of the organization, the lawyer must
inform that party that he or she represents the organization.98
Appropriately identifying the organization as the client is equally important when the
GC, or other internal lawyer, is discussing legal matters with employees.99 Like any client, an
organization can chose to waive privilege if it desires. The ramifications of the failure to identify
the organization as client is somewhat unclear, however, if privilege is challenged; it is in the
best interest of the organization to produce a clear record of client identification.100
A strong and independent GC is best equipped to avoid role confusion or the perception
of impropriety. Integration into the top echelons of an organization, along with unencumbered
access to the Board, enables a GC to fulfil his or her obligations as business partner and guardian
of a corporation’s reputation. The duties of the GC are made ever less onerous when
accompanied by personal relationships and unfettered contact with the Board.
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IV.

The Role of the Chief Compliance Officer
At its most elemental, the CCO is responsible for developing the policies to ensure

ethical and legally compliant behavior within a company, as well as procedures to detect,
mitigate, and sanction ethical or legal malfeasance after it has occurred.101 The precise duties of
the CCO vary across industries and companies, but generally, the CCO is delegated the proactive
responsibility of implementing a compliance program composed of the elements of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the reactive function of monitoring for adherence to that program.102
A. Background and Scope of Today’s CCO
Understanding the different mentality of the two roles may be helpful to illustrate how
the GC and CCO are distinct. One commentator noted that a corporate lawyer is trained and
employed to craft the law to best serve his or her client.103 It is natural, therefore, for such a
lawyer to resist cooperation with government, except perhaps if doing so will help him or her to
mitigate a client’s penalty.104 Underlying compliance, is the obligation to report credible
evidence of misconduct to the appropriate regulating agency.105 Therefore, while the CCO and
the GC are similar, the CCO is focused on compliance detection, and resolution, whereas the
GC’s “duty is to protect [an organization’s] liability profile.”106
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There is “a conventional assumption that a firm’s enforcement policies are designed to
maximize its profit.”107 Government is able to shape corporate behavior by using laws and
regulations and the respondeat superior standard of corporate liability to hold organizations
civilly and criminally liable for employee and organization misconduct.108 Organizations defend
against future enforcement by adopting preventive measures that deter agent misconduct.109
Compliance programs have been around since the 1960s, however, in recent decades they
have assumed greater prominence in reaction to increased prosecution and regulatory
oversight.110 While in some respects the responsibilities of the compliance function overlap with
that of the legal function, the roles are distinct. Both the GC and CCO are responsible for
ensuring an organization’s adherence to the law, however, the GC “provides legal advice on how
the organization can comply with the law . . . [while the] CCO, by contrast, is a management
function which incorporates legal considerations while influencing processes and practices of an
organization.”111 In reality, the roles often intersect as both functions are involved with the
creation and implementation of compliance programs and mitigating risk, however for reasons
that will be discussed, understanding the boundaries of each respective function has important
operational and legal consequences.112 One commentator recently opined that the CCO’s
responsibilities extend beyond prevention and include an obligation to investigate and
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uncover.113 In perhaps an over simplification, he continued that “unlike the GC, [] the CCO’s
job is to help ensure compliance, rather than just advise about it.”114
The scope of a CCO’s authority varies across organizations and industries. In addition to
the healthcare and securities compliance, on which this paper is focused, many companies
implement anti-trust, employment, and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act compliance programs.115
For example, in Reserve Supply Corp., v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., the court held that
the lower court properly granted summary judgment on claims of price fixing because the pricing
was made pursuant to the organization’s anti-trust compliance program.116
The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is an anti-corruption law designed to
prevent companies with ties to the U.S. from bribing foreign government officials.117 DOJ states
that an effective compliance program is essential for compliance with FCPA, in particular to
comply with the internal control provisions118 which set forth specific internal accounting
controls for preventing bribery.119
B. Expanded Compliance Duties under SOX and the Federal Sentencing
Commission Guidelines
In the finance sector, independent compliance functions developed in the 1960’s “out of
securities firms’ need to receive advice and support concerning broad responsibility concerning
day-to-day conduct of business unit activities” and have in place procedures to promote
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compliance with all applicable laws and regulations.120 From these, and other nascent
compliance functions, evolved rigorous compliance programs ordered toward protecting
consumers, employees, and the public.121 The role of the CCO within a financial institution is
particularly challenging because of the ever accelerating introduction of intricate financial
products and the proliferation of complex laws and regulations enacted in response to the recent
financial crises and scandals.122 These burdens, which have exponentially expanded compliance
risks and obligations, are compounded by the linear trajectory of compliance budget increases.123
In seeking to comply with the profusion of new requirements and best practices, the SEC
encourages compliance officials not to become bogged down in minutia, but rather use their
skills and experience to identify important issues and provide the firm and its employees with
timely and constructive solutions.124
Pursuant to its mandate in SOX, the Federal Sentencing Commission set forth the
requirements of an effective compliance and ethics program.125 SOX specifically instructed the
Commission to update the Federal Sentencing Guidelines such as to make them “sufficient to
deter and punish organizational criminal misconduct.”126 Broadly, the Guidelines are intended to
achieve two objectives. First, they are intended to ensure that organizations sentenced for
violation of the law are “justly punished.”127 Second, the Guidelines offer incentives for
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organizations to detect and address violations and to put systems in place to help prevent future
malfeasance.128 One report provided that “[o]rganizations can mitigate potential fines by as
much as 95% by demonstrating that they have ‘effective’ compliance and ethics programs.” 129
The Guidelines require organizations to delegate responsibility for compliance and ethics
programs to specific “high-level personnel”.130 Additionally, the Guidelines instruct companies
to assign employees “the day-to-day operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics
program,” with periodic reporting obligation to high-level personnel.131 Importantly, the
Guidelines require that these designated individuals be given sufficient resources and authority to
successfully carry out their compliance obligations.132 The Guidelines make it clear that to
qualify for sentencing mitigation, the compliance function must actually be operational –
supplied with sufficient resources and personnel who have a clear line of reporting to higherlevel personnel.133 DOJ reinforced this sentiment in the Yates Memo.134 It states that to be
eligible for “cooperation credit, organizations must provide [DOJ] with all relevant facts about
the individuals involved in the corporate misconduct. The Guidelines, and the Yates Memo, fall
short, however, of mandating how specifically organizations structure their compliance programs
and/or their relationship to the GC.135
The scope of the CCO’s duties, and the obligations of the compliance function that he or
she oversees, varies by organization. In some industries, for example financial services, the
CCO typically has a developed understanding of the various business units, while in other
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industries, “CCO’s may depend on so-called specialists in the business who have the
responsibility to determine that the company is in compliance.”136 Increasingly, many
compliance obligations are fulfilled by colleagues or external consultants located outside of the
compliance function.137 Specialized compliance obligations, for example data privacy, are
typically managed within specific operational functions, with the CCO providing oversight, but
not direct managerial authority.138
The Guidelines recognize the limitations that size and resources have on an organization.
While smaller organizations are required to “demonstrate the same degree of commitment to
ethical conduct and compliance with the laws as larger organizations,” they are expected to do so
while devoting less resources.139 A smaller organization can demonstrate that organization’s
commitment to ethical conduct by adopting simple procedures to accomplish obligations that, for
a larger organization, could only be demonstrated by adopting a more formal processes.140 For
example, large organizations are expected to develop programs and hire dedicated compliance
and ethics personnel, whereas small organizations could meet the same requirements by
conducting training through informal staff meetings and monitoring “through walk-arounds”
conducted by business personnel.141 These comments simply reinforce that the Guidelines are
less concerned about observing a specific compliance structure, than they are about promoting a
more ethical corporate culture through expanded oversight.
The CCO position is dynamic and uniquely straddles the legal and business worlds. As
the CCO role grows to meet increasingly complex requirements, so does the potential for the
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CCO to bring real value to his or her organization through mitigating the effect of illegal and
unethical behavior.
V.

Compliance Obligations of the Board of Directors and Senior Management
As discussed, compliance obligations and best practices come from a variety of sources.

Caremark held that directors owe a fiduciary duty of care to the organization that requires,
among other things, that the Board act in good faith to ensure that a proper system of oversight
and reporting is in place.142 The specific form of the compliance program is a matter of business
judgement, however, the failure of directors to oversee the adoption of an adequate system of
reporting could expose the organization, and individual directors, to liability.143
A. Director Duties
The Caremark duties are impressive on paper, however in practice, they rarely lead to
director liability.144 Companies and directors face far greater consequences under the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines and from regulators, than they do under Caremark.145 In
Stone v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted the Caremark holding as the standard
under Delaware corporate law.146 Citing Caremark, the court provided that “a claim that
directors are subject to personal liability for employee failures is “possibly the most difficult
theory in corporate law upon which a plaintiff may hope to win a judgment.”147

Caremark, supra note 8 (holding a “director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a
corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so
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The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines provide directors with incentives for establishing
and maintain an effective compliance program.148 Additionally, the promulgation of the Yates
Memo put increased pressure on directors with its focus on individuals.149 The Memo makes
clear that DOJ will not permit directors to leverage company settlements to allow the individual
directors to escape criminal or civil liability.150 A corporate resolution will be permitted to serve
a release for civil or criminal liability only under extraordinary circumstances and requires
written approval from the relevant Assistant Attorney General.151
As with so many facets of compliance, CIAs and DPAs are fertile resources for
discerning what the government deems important parts of an effective compliance apparatus.
CIA’s typically have a section that enumerates the Board’s compliance obligations. The 2015
CIA that OIG entered into with Daiichi Sankyo, Inc. states that the Board, or a committee there
of, has oversight authority over matters related to compliance with the federal health care
program requirements.152 This obligation requires the Board to meet at least quarterly to review
the company’s compliance program.153 Additionally, for each reporting period of the CIA, each
member of the Board must sign a resolution attesting to oversight of the compliance program.154
Industry leaders stress the importance of attracting directors with compliance
backgrounds and encourage broader formation of “discrete compliance committees.”155 While
dedicated compliance committees may be prevalent in certain industries, or among the largest
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sector participants, their existence is by no means ubiquitous.156 At a recent compliance
symposium hosted by the RAND Corporation, one participant estimated that only around twenty
percent of corporations in the United States have Board-level compliance committees, however
he failed to state how many of the organizations had organizationally adopted that structure and
how many did so to satisfy a settlement condition.157
C. Management’s Reporting Obligations
In addition to the fiduciary duties that all directors and senior management owe to the
organization, SOX imposes on them more formalized reporting requirements.158 Currently the
CEO and CFO of all publically traded companies must certify the accuracy of financial reports
quarterly or annually.159 Additionally, those officers, or persons similarly situated, must attest to
the existence of effective internal controls within the organization, and any deficiencies in their
“design or operation” that could expose the organization to risk.160 The signing officers must
certify that they have disclosed these deficiencies to the firm’s auditor and the Board’s audit
committee.161 These requirements indicate that the personal liability of those with oversight
authority, namely senior management and directors, is a serious and pervasive reality.162
VI.

CCO Reporting to GC

The relationship between GC and CCO functions can be organized in a number of ways.
Recently, there has been much discussion over the reporting relationship between the GC and
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CCO, specifically whether the CCO should report to the GC, or whether the CCO should stand
alone as a separate board-level reporting function.163
The GC and CCO are linked regardless of the structural arrangement. Conventional wisdom
veers toward consolidating, or subordinating the CCO position, on the basis that compliance is
largely a legal function and should, therefore, be situated within the legal department.164
Oftentimes smaller organizations, lack the resources to employ both a GC and CCO, therefore,
“as a practical matter one person must wear two hats.”165 In response to an increase in
prosecutions and guidance166 from various government agencies, many organizations are
revaluating both the one-person-two-hat model and the model whereby the CCO directly reports
to the GC.167
Recent research identified a trend among some companies towards a more traditional
hierarchical arrangement between the legal and compliance function motivated by logistics and
complexity.168 In reaction to the increasingly burgeoning regulatory environment in which many
companies do business, the legal and compliance functions are evermore entwined. The GC’s
access to the Board and senior management, and maybe even more so, his or her role as guardian
of the corporation’s integrity169 elevates the GC to a unique position in the organization.170 The
SEC expects the GC to leverage this station to promote compliance throughout the
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organization.171 Consolidating oversight for the compliance function under the GC, where he or
she can transition from advisor to architect, may better enable the GC to support compliance.
Guidance provided in a joint publication of the American Health Lawyers Association (AHLA)
and the OIG, recognizes that the ABA’s suggestion that the GC become more involved with the
compliance function; this contradicts OIG’s guidance favoring separation of the functions.172
Regardless of the reporting relationship between the GC and CCO, interaction and collaboration
between the functions is inevitable and should be encouraged.
While the potential for significant cost saving may prove a compelling enticement to a
Board, there are serious risks in adopting a corporate structure whereby the GC and CCO are one
individual, or whereby the CCO reports to GC. First, confusion may arise when the GC is the
CCO or is his or her supervisor because the company’s compliance goals may be at odds with
the company’s legal objectives.173 For example, if a GC becomes aware of a constituent’s
“legally problematic behavior,” he or she has an obligation to respond in a manner that protects
the organization.174 This can conflict with the CCO’s obligation to identify the misconduct and
put practices in place to prevent future misconduct. If a GC “has direct charge over
implementing a corporate compliance program, as opposed to involvement in designing the
compliance programs and serving an educative role with the corporation with respect to these
requirements,” he or she may be unable to be an effective and objective advocate for the
corporation.175
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Second, subordinating the CCO to the GC can lead to issues concerning the extent to which
information and investigations are covered by the attorney-client privilege.176 Even when the
COO is a standalone position reporting directly to the Board, the presence of both functions in an
internal investigation may make it difficult to determine when information was obtained for “the
purpose of obtaining legal advice,” or when information was simply obtained “pursuant to
routine business polices or regulatory requirements.”177 Liberally invoking privilege risks
raising the suspicion of regulators and inviting further investigation.178 Regulators also may
move to compel production of materials, potentially rightly privileged, under the “crime-fraud”
exception.179
The crime-fraud exception is an exception to the attorney-client privilege that allows for
the disclosure of information when the client uses or attempts to use the lawyer’s services to
perpetrate or cover up a crime.180 Where the GC has oversight authority over the CCO, or serves
simultaneously in both rules, he or she must be attentive to when he or she is
acting/communicating in a legal capacity, or in compliance capacity.181
Information obtained by a corporation during the course of an internal investigation for legal
purposes is subject to the attorney-client privilege.182 One commentator remarked that “attorneyclient privilege is the still the primary evidentiary tool for maintaining the confidentiality of
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privileged documents.”183 If this privilege is challenged, the court will make a factual
determination as to whether the information was truly produced as a result of qualifying
confidential relationship.184 Since it can be hard for an “organization to predict and understand
when the attorney-client privilege will apply,” it behooves the GC, and other internal attorneys,
to make it clear when they are giving legal advice, and when they are just providing a
perspective on a business decision.185 Involvement of compliance, or another business function
need not eschew the protections afforded by privilege, but in light of recent precedent,186 it
should be made clear that the investigation is being “conducted by counsel,” for the “purpose of
obtaining legal advice.”187 In the end, companies may choose to waive privilege in the interest
offering transparent and to obtain cooperation credit to avoid
Budget concerns, the desire for effective communication, and efficiency are legitimate
reasons to subordinate the CCO to the GC or combine the functions. However, short-term
monetary gain should not blind an organization to the risk of the much costlier expense of future
prosecution.
VII.

Standalone CCO and GC

Currently, formal separation or the CCO and GC is not required by the SEC, HHS, or
other government agencies. However, requirements imposed on companies in recent settlements
demonstrate that separation is the preferred structure.
A. Office of Inspector General
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OIG enforces federal laws and regulations “enacted to prevent fraud and abuse in the
healthcare industry.”188 OIG cannot bring criminal charges against an organization, but it can
refer cases to DOJ and can impose civil monetary penalties under the Civil Monetary Penalties
Law189, the Anti-Kickback Statute190 and the False Claims Act.191 OIG publishes compliance
program guidance for organizations operating in many segments of the health care industry.192
This guidance is intended to help organizations develop effective internal control to remain
complaint with state and federal law.
OIG guidance is not binding, but it provides an insight into preferred best practices.
Many of the guidance documents include the same footnote stating that “OIG believes it is
generally not advisable for the compliance function to be subordinate to the [pharmaceutical
manufacturer’s, hospitals, clinical laboratory’s . . .] general counsel.”193 By separating the GC
and CCO, “a system of checks and balances is established” helping organizations “more
effectively achieve the goals of the compliance program.”194
Further, OIG’s preference for the bifurcation of GC and CCO function is evident in the
CIAs that it has entered into with offending organizations. For example in 2006, Tenet
Healthcare Corporation (Tenet) agreed to pay $900 million to resolve liability for violations of
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the False Claims Act.195 Additionally, Tenet entered into a five year long CIA with OIG.196 The
CIA required that Tenet implement and maintain a compliance program overseen by a CCO who
is a senior member of management.197 The CIA stated that the CCO could not be or be
subordinate to the CFO, CEO, or GC, and that the CCO must report directly to the Board.198
Additionally, the CCO was required to deliver quarterly report to the Board on the status of the
compliance program.199 These terms were not unique to the Tenet CIA200, and have continued to
be commonly included subsequent in settlements.201
The Tenent CIA, however included “unprecedented provision requiring the Quality,
Compliance, and Ethic Committee of Tenent’s Board of Directors to undertake a review of the
effectiveness of Tenent’s compliance program.”202 Additionally, the CIA included the
requirement that Tenent submit annual reports certified by the company’s officers, that the
organization was in compliance with Federal health care program requirements.203
In 2012, OIG held a roundtable meeting with representatives from 32 organizations that
entered into CIAs with OIG since 2009.204 With a focus toward future CIAs, OIG solicited
feedback on, among other things, the role of the CCO.205 Participants expressed approval of the
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requirement that the CCO report directly to the Board, and not the GC.206 Additionally,
participants “stated the importance of having the compliance officer be a member of senior
management. These suggestions remain features of post-roundtable CIA’s207
B. Department of Justice
DOJ has likewise articulated a preference for separating the GC and CCO positions.
DOJ, unlike OIG, is enforcing criminal law. As a result, their guidance is found in the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines208 and DPAs209.
Eligibility for sentence mitigation under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines requires
“high-level personnel within the organization” to delegate day-to-day operational responsibilities
to specific individuals.210 These individuals, in turn, are required to periodically report to the
high-level personnel about the state of the compliance program.211 The Guidelines define highlevel personnel within the organization as those individuals in controlling or substantial policyrelated positions, including directors, the CEO, and other senior management.212 In mandating
both high-level oversight and requiring that the staff operating the compliance program report
directly to the Board, the updated Guidelines help to preserve an “independent voice, free of any
potential filtering by senior organization mangers.”213
The Guidelines stop short of mandating that the CCO be autonomous from the GC.
However, many business leaders have highlighted the importance of preserving independent
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communication between the CCO and the Board as a reason to split the functions.214 A CCO
who controls the compliance budget and can make personnel decisions, and most importantly
Additionally, as OIG has stated many times, a CCO who has direct access to the Board, is a
“check” to an organization’s compliance efforts.215
Like OIG, as a condition for settlement, DOJ requires that an organization’s CCO be a
member of senior management who reports directly to the Board.216
VIII. Conclusion
Guidance from agencies articulates a clear preference for bifurcating the roles of CCO
and GC. This separation is not now, nor may it ever be, mandated by law, but business judgment
and best practices dictate that the Board and senior management should seriously consider
bifurcation and be ready to defend a decision to preserve the CCO in a subordinate positon to the
GC.
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